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the gap is due to differences in observable characteristics or to unexplained variations in the returns 
to these characteristics. We find the gap to be associated with the unexplained component. We 
argue that the finding is mainly due to female gender favoritism in loans to micro and small firms 
because (i) the gap is reversed for medium size enterprises and, (ii) we find no sign of superior 
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1.  Introduction 
The manufacturing sector in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries has improved its performance 
in the new millennium but most observers find that the African region could be doing much better. 
The country rankings in the recent Doing Business Reports clearly illustrate a comparatively poor 
environment for private sector development and the recent Investment Climate Assessment surveys 
identify access to credit as one of the key constraints to private sector growth. While tight credit 
may reflect weak entrepreneurship and poor quality of investment projects, the interest rates in 
many SSA countries often appear higher than economic fundamentals merit. Understanding the 
financial system in these countries is therefore important when examining key financing constraints 
facing private firms. 
 
Several SSA countries have common problems and challenges within the financial system. Financial 
markets are often tight and weak. Commercial banks dominate the financial sector and relatively 
few banks account for the majority of total bank assets. In most countries, non-bank financial 
institutions represent a relatively small addition to overall credit availability, average loan sizes are 
considerably smaller, and interests higher than in the commercial bank sector. Moreover, the 
coverage of informal (local moneylender) and semi-informal (trade-credit) loan markets is also 
rather restricted in most SSA countries. The limited competition has resulted in a rigid financial 
system with low levels of financial intermediation, high profit margins—often helped on its way by 
excessively high fees on banking services—and a large interest rate spread between deposits and 
loans. Adding to the problem, domestic financing of public budget deficits also put an upward 
pressure on interest rates and crowd-out funds to the private sector in many of the countries. 
 
If the poor performance of the financial sector is the main cause of lack of credit in the 
manufacturing sector then identifying and describing credit constrained firms can help policy makers 
target the firms that are more likely to face binding financial constraints. Such targeting is one of the 
explicit instruments for economic growth and increased employment in Africa. A key issue in the 
targeting has been to ensure credit to female entrepreneurs as they are found to be less likely to get 
financing from the formal financial sector (see Klapper and Parker, 2010 for a recent survey of 
gender issues in entrepreneurship). However, as highlighted in the most recent World Development 
Report “Gender Equality and Development” (WDR, 2011), data on access need to be interpreted 
with caution because they could reflect gender differences in the demand for credit. Moreover, it is 




at the household level, less is known about gender discrimination in credit allocation among formal 
entrepreneurs in Africa. 
 
Currently, a group of bilateral donors are in the process of establishing an African Guarantee Fund 
(AGF) in collaboration with the African Development Bank with the explicit aim of increasing the 
financial resources available for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). The AGF will mainly 
provide guarantees to the already existing African financial institutions who are lending to SMEs. 
Thus the AGF is not aimed at changing the structure of the financial system as such. Instead, the 
facility will influence the lending decisions within the banks so as to increase the access to credit for 
SMEs. As the AGF facility is working through the existing financial institutions, it is important to 
understand the current credit policies of the commercial banks. Specifically, as donors often value 
gender balance in the growth process, the current policies vis-à-vis male and female entrepreneurs 
must be analyzed. If SMEs owned by women are more credit constrained because of higher risks 
associated with observable factors such as experience, education or lack of concrete business plans, 
then the AGF should focus on developing tools to support the demand side, i.e., provide support for 
development of business plans and exchange of experience within SMEs owned by women. On the 
other hand, if the commercial banks are simply discriminating or favoring SMEs owned by women 
then the AGF must push the banking sector to change the current credit policies. 
 
In this paper we use firm level data from eight Sub-Saharan Africa countries to examine credit 
constraint differentials between male and female manufacturing entrepreneurs. Rather than 
analyzing the extent of formal financing we apply a direct approach to measuring credit constrained 
firms using specific credit questions in the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys conducted 
by the World Bank in 2006/7. As the classification of firms into credit constrained and unconstrained 
is not simple in empirical work we make use of two definitions. The first definition classifies firms as 
constrained or unconstrained solely based on firm responses to specific credit questions. By the 
second definition we reclassify constrained firms to being unconstrained if the survey data show 
they already have credit involvement with the formal financial sector. 
 
A sharp distinction between male and female entrepreneurship is also difficult because firms may 
have several owners. Therefore, we also work with two different samples; one large sample of all 
enterprises in which we identify a firm as having female ownership if at least one of the owners is a 
woman, and a smaller sample, in which we only analyze single ownership firms. Focusing on single 




constraint definitions and both enterprise samples because several results are dependent on the 
combination of choices.  
 
By our stringent definition of being credit constrained, enterprises owned by female entrepreneurs 
are on average about 3 to 5 percentage points less likely to be credit constrained compared to their 
male counterparts, depending on the sample used. However, changing either the constraint 
definition or the sample this gap drops to about 2 percentage points, or lower.  Results like these are 
not uncommon in the literature, see Klapper and Parker (2010), and they are comparable to the 
results in Aterido et al. (2011) who also use the ICA data. 
  
Using the generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, we investigate the extent to which the gender 
credit constraint gap is due to differences in observable characteristics between female and male 
operated firms (the explained component), or to variations in the returns to these characteristics 
(the unexplained component). The results show that the credit gap is mostly due to differences in 
the unexplained component. We look into possible explanatory factors for the result and we note 
that the gender credit constraint gap is closely associated with firm size. Splitting the samples into 
micro/small and medium size enterprises we show how the gap is reversed for medium size 
enterprises. Furthermore, generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions show that for micro/small 
enterprises the gap (favoring female owned firms) is mainly due to the unexplained component 
while the gap (favoring male owned firms) is more due to differences in characteristics for medium 
size enterprises. Hence, the overall result is driven by the large fraction of micro and small 
enterprises in the data. 
 
The prime explanation put forward for the female gender favoritism in credit is self-selection into 
entrepreneurship. By this hypothesis women are, on average, better entrepreneurs than men 
because they have to be “more capable” than men to become entrepreneurs (see Aterido et al. 
(2011) for an exploration). We examine this hypothesis indirectly by testing if the gender of the 
owner has an independent effect on observable productivity outcomes measured by capacity 
utilization, labor productivity and firm employment growth. As we find no significant gender effect, 
conditional on firm characteristics and sector fixed effects, we believe the hypothesis to be largely 
unsupported. We, therefore, conclude that the credit constraint gap is caused by favoritism towards 
micro and small enterprises with female ownership.  




The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we define our main variables of interest and describe 
the data used for the econometric analysis. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and presents 
the results followed by a concluding discussion in Section 4.  
 
2.  Data and Definitions 
The Doing Business data ranks Sub-Saharan Africa as the region where it is most difficult to carry out 
business, although several SSA countries have improved their ranking considerably since the 
publication of the first Doing Business report in 2003. However, the private sector business 
environment generally remains poor in SSA and several investment climate assessment surveys 
(ICAs) point to access to credit as one of the key constraints to private sector growth. This holds for 
the eight countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda 
—considered in this paper. More than 50 percent of the firms in our sample perceive lack of access 
to finance to be a serious or very serious constraint to firm growth (Figure 1). The aggregate number 
masks substantial country variation, with only 25 percent severely credit constrained in Ethiopia as 
compared to 66 percent in Ghana. However, when asked about whether they believe that access to 
finance is the most serious obstacle to growth, only 16 percent respond affirmative, again with 
considerable country variation behind this aggregate figure.
1 Hence, while lack of credit is a severe 
problem for the enterprises in the eight countries it is not necessarily suffocating them.  
 
FIGURE 1: PERCEIVED CREDIT CONSTRAINTS 
 
                                                 
1 Problems with access to electricity are considered as the most serious constraint to growth by almost 50 




The data on which our analysis is based comes from different Investment Climate Assessment 
surveys carried out in 2006/7 by the World Bank. We focus exclusively on manufacturing firms and 
due to differences in sampling approach across the countries we concentrate on firms with 5 or 
more employees and exclude companies with more than 300 employees. As such we only consider 
micro (5 to 9 employees), small (10 to 49 employees) and medium (50 to 300 employees) 
enterprises in the analysis. For a detailed description of the data and the sampling approach we refer 
to information provided on the World Bank enterprise survey homepage 
www.enterprisesurveys.org. The original data consists of 3,368 enterprise records. However, after 
data cleaning we were left with 2,942 observations across the eight countries. 
 
2.1  Defining Credit Constrained Firms 
We employ a direct approach to analyzing credit constraints using two slightly different definitions. 
We recognize that credit constraint studies may be subject to selection bias since not all enterprises 
have credit demand. We therefore follow Bigsten et al. (2003) and Byiers et al. (2010) in (i) first 
identifying firms with demand for external finance, and (ii) conditional on such credit demand 
establishing the characteristics of credit constrained firms. The survey instrument has information 
explaining why firms did not apply for credit - one being that the firm has “no need for a loan – 
establishment has sufficient capital”. Table 1 shows reasons for not applying.  
 
Constraint Definition 1 
By Constraint Definition 1, we include both applicants and non-applicants by categorizing a firm as 
credit constrained if it (i) applied and was denied credit (applicants) or (ii) did not apply for credit 
due to reasons such as “application procedures to complex”, “collateral requirements unattainable”, 
or “possible loan size and maturity insufficient” (non-applicants). Following Bigsten et al. (2003) we 
do not include firms responding “interest rates to high” or “did not believe it would be approved” as 
being part of the constrained firms because such answers may reflect that investment projects 
simply are not competitive at going interest rates. 
 
Firms applying and being denied credit may not have sustainable business plans and should 
therefore not be classified as credit constrained. Table 1 reports loan rejection reasons cited by the 
lender. About 36 percent of the rejections were based on collateral issues. However, several firms 
answered “Insufficient profitability (of the project proposal and historically)”. We classify these as 





TABLE 1: NUMBER OF FORMAL LOAN APPLICANTS 
 
      Yes        No 
Applied for a loan     586        2356 
(20)     (80) 
   Yes  No          
Problems getting the loan   231  355    
(39) (61)     
Problem, why?              Did not apply, why?       
Collateral/Cosigners unacceptable  85  (37)     No need for a loan  612  (26) 
Insufficient profitability  21  (9)     Application procedures to complex  404  (17) 
Problems with credit history  18  (8)     Interest rates too high  610  (26) 
Incomplete loan application  22  (10)     Collateral requirements unattainable  355  (15) 
Concern about current debt level  7  (3)     Size/maturity of loans insufficient  67  (3) 
Other  78  (34)     Did not think it would be approved  115  (5) 
   Other  193  (8) 
Currently has a line of credit or a loan  Yes  No  Yes  No     Yes  No 
61 170  299  56      179 2177 
   (26)  (74)  (84)  (16)    (8)  (92) 




Constraint Definition 2 
In classification by Constraint Definition 2 we start from Definition 1 and subsequently re-classify 
firms from constrained to unconstrained if they (i) currently have a bank loan or a line of credit, (ii) 
have access to overdraft facilities, and/or (iii) financed (part of) their last investment using a loan 
from a formal financial institution. 
 
Table 1 also gives an overview of the current loan situation of the firms. The data suggests that 
financial market involvement (formal borrowing) is rather weak, supporting the findings in Bigsten et 
al. (2003). Only 19 percent of the sampled firms currently have a line of credit or a loan from a 
formal financial institution, and only 19 percent of the firms financed their last larger investment 
using formal bank financing (not reported). In terms of other financial services, the number of firms 
with an overdraft facility seems to increase with firm size. However, contrary to Bigsten et al. (2003) 
our data do not suggest that firms use overdrafts more than loans (18 percent have access to an 

















Ethiopia 58.8  35.8  70.8  30.4  58.0  87.6  (257) 
Ghana 56.8  45.0  80.9  19.4  78.8 84.9  (278) 
Kenya 19.4  7.9  97.3  48.5  95.6  76.6  (367) 
Mozambique 26.3  23.3  66.0  7.8  63.6  83.9  (335) 
Nigeria 47.3  44.7  88.5  4.2  88.0 79.7  (907) 
Senegal 55.9  43.7  80.3  15.4  76.8  84.6  (254) 
Tanzania 45.0  35.3  79.9  27.7 78.3  84.3  (249) 
Uganda 26.4  22.4  77.6  21.0  74.6  80.7  (295) 
Total 41.8  33.8  82.3  18.5  79.5  81.9  (2,942)
Note: Figures are percentages (observations in parenthesis). 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the share of credit constrained firms according to the two credit 
constraint definitions. About 42 percent of the firms in the sample are credit constrained according 
to Definition 1. Excluding firms that currently have a bank loan, overdraft facilities, or financed 
recent investments using formal loans (Definition 2) reduces the share of constrained firms to 34 
percent. From Table 2 it is also transparent that Kenya is somewhat special in that fewer firms are 
financially constrained in the formal credit market compared to the other countries considered. 
Finally, we find in Table 2 that although 82 percent of the firms have formal credit demand, only 19 
percent of the firms have formal debt, whereas almost 80 percent of the firms are engaged in 
informal credit arrangements. 
 
2.2  Credit Constraints and Gender of the Firm Owner  
Turning, in Table 3, to the association between credit constraints and the gender of the firm owner 
we operate with two different samples. First, considering all enterprises in the sample, we consider a 
firm to have female ownership if any of the firm owners are female. Further, recognizing that 
multiple owner firms with partly female ownership does not ensure that the firm can be classified as 
a female operated entity, we also use a smaller sample having only firms with a single owner, who is 
not registered as foreign (2,034 observations).  
 
In our data approximately the same share of female and male operated firms have formal credit 
demand and use informal debt sources, but a larger share of female operated firms has formal debt. 
The figures are confirmed by noting that firms with female ownership are on average less credit 
constrained, regardless of the constraint definition applied or of considering all or only single 





TABLE 3: THE SHARE OF CONSTRAINED ENTERPRISES (%) BY GENDER 
All firms  Single owner firms 
Female Male Female Male 
Constraint Definition 1  40.1  42.3  45.7  47.0 
Constraint Definition 2  29.8  35.1  38.4  40.9 
Has  debt  82.8 82.1 80.6 80.4 
Formal  debt  23.6 16.8 14.0 11.4 
Trade credits/Informal debt  79.3  79.6  78.0  78.5 
Formal  Demand  83.1 81.5 82.0 83.3 
Observations  734 2,208 422 1,612 
Note: Figures are percentages. 
 
 
2.3  Credit Constraint Determinants  
According to Bigsten et al. (2003) a model of credit demand should be able to capture differences 
between the capital returns and the cost of capital. Ideally we would proxy capital returns by the 
gross profit share of total assets (profit rate). However, due to missing data we only include location 
and sector indicators as controls for shocks to the conditions faced by firms in the different areas of 
the economies. The distribution of the data across countries, capitol/non-capitol, and industry 
sectors is given in Table 4. 
 
To model the cost of capital side, we need to include variables capturing (i) the opportunity cost of 
capital, (ii) collateral requirements, and (iii) loan transaction costs. For opportunity costs we include 
a number of different proxies for the availability of alternative sources of funds. Several studies (see 
Bigsten and Söderbom (2006) for an overview) have found informal loans and trade credit as an 
important source of especially working capital financing, and we therefore include an indicator for 
having access to trade credit and/or informal credit sources and another indicator for being a 
subsidiary/part of another firm. Further, van Biesebroeck (2005) documents that exporting firms use 
trade credit more frequently, and we therefore also include an export participation indicator. 
 
In addition we include proxies for access to collateral and loan transaction costs. Due to missing 
asset data we cannot fully cover important aspects of access to collateral. However, we include a 
wide range of variables representing various aspects of transaction costs: (i) an indicator 
representing whether the firm is a sole proprietorship, (ii) an indicator for partly foreign ownership, 
(iii), the owners experience (in years), and finally (iv) firm age. The distributional features in form of 





TABLE 4: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY CONSTRAINT CLASSIFICATION 
   Total  Constrained   Unconstrained  
Mean  sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Firm specific determinants         
Gender (Female ownership = 1)  0.249  0.433  0.239  0.427  0.257  0.437 
Single owner firms: Gender Female ownership = 1) 0.207  0.406  0.203  0.402  0.211  0.409 
Ethnicity (Minority = 1)  0.148  0.355  0.074  0.262  0.200  0.400 
Firm size (Number of employees)  30.2  43.7  21.8  34.4  36.3  48.4 
Firm age (Years)  15.1  11.2  13.9  9.7  16.1  12.1 
Location (Capitol = 1)  0.515  0.500  0.468  0.499  0.549  0.498 
Legal ownership form (Sole proprietorship = 1)  0.614  0.487  0.706  0.456  0.547  0.498 
Part of firm under foreign ownership (Yes = 1)  0.080  0.271  0.047  0.212  0.103  0.304 
Firm part of a larger establishment (Yes = 1)  0.090  0.286  0.059 0.236 0.112 0.316 
Export directly (Yes = 1)  0.093  0.291  0.059  0.236  0.118  0.323 
Manager  experience  (Years)  13.7  9.4 13.3 9.1 14.0 9.6 
Firm use informal credit sources (Yes = 1)  0.795  0.403  0.798  0.401  0.793  0.405 
Sectors         
Food  and  Beverages  0.288  0.453 0.234 0.423 0.327 0.469 
Garments  and  Textiles  0.235  0.424 0.288 0.453 0.196 0.397 
Chemicals and Non-metallic minerals  0.058 0.235  0.040  0.200 0.072 0.258 
Wood and metalwork  0.237  0.425  0.269  0.443  0.215  0.411 
Other  manufacturing  0.182  0.386 0.170 0.376 0.190 0.392 
Countries         
Ethiopia  0.087  0.282 0.123 0.328 0.062 0.241 
Ghana  0.094  0.293 0.129 0.335 0.070 0.255 
Kenya  0.125  0.330 0.058 0.233 0.173 0.378 
Mozambique  0.114  0.318 0.072 0.258 0.144 0.351 
Nigeria  0.308  0.462 0.349 0.477 0.279 0.449 
Senegal  0.086  0.281 0.116 0.320 0.065 0.247 
Tanzania  0.085  0.278 0.091 0.288 0.080 0.271 
Uganda  0.100  0.300 0.063 0.244 0.127 0.333 
Number of observations  2,942  1,229  1,713 
Note: The categorization is based on Constraint Definition 1. Single owner firms (row 2) have 2,034, 951 and 1,803 
observations, respectively. 
 
Several studies have shown that minority groups in Africa are often in a better position to get credit 
than the African majority, see for example Fafchamps (2000), Fisman (2003), and Biggs and Shah 
(2006). Table 4 shows that the minority group (India/Middle East/Asian/European) is noticeably less 
credit constrained than the majority group of African firm owners in our sample, confirming the 
findings of the previous studies. 
 
Finally, we include firm size (the number of employees) allowing us to analyze if there is a firm size 
bias in credit allocation even when controlling for different aspects of firm heterogeneity.
2 
                                                 
2 In addition to the included variables we also have information (although only for 2,627 enterprises) on firm 
growth, if the firm keeps external audited accounts and if the firm is located in an industrial processing zone. 




3.  Empirical Strategy and Results 
The empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we investigate the association between 
gender and the probability of being credit constrained using a traditional probit model, controlling 
for the factors described above. The model is standard in the literature as the main focus has been 
on the definition of credit constraints. We take a close look at the gender gap for the average shares 
of credit constrained firms and try to disentangle the gap into explained and unexplained 
components by applying a generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Next, we illustrate that firm 
size is an important determinant of the probability of being credit constrained and, importantly, firm 
size has differential impacts on male and female owned firms. We investigate the importance of this 
size dependence by splitting the sample into micro/small and medium size enterprises.  We show 
how the gender gap is reversed for medium size firms compared to micro and small firms and 
further that the gap for medium size firms is in part explained by differences in firm characteristics 
while this is not the case for micro and small firms. Finally, we look into the question if the favorable 
treatment of female owned micro and small firms is related to discrimination in the 
entrepreneurship selection. We find no support for that hypothesis in terms of gender differentials 
in capacity utilization, labor productivity growth, or firm growth. Hence, we find no observable, or 
revealed, capability differences amongst male and female owned firms.  
 
3.1  Conditional Gender Effects on the Probability of Being Credit Constrained  
Table 5 presents estimated average marginal effects on the probability of being credit constrained 
for both credit constraints definitions and both firm ownership samples. Country and sector 
indicators are included in all regressions and they are highly significant (as groups). 
 
As suggested by the bivariate associations in Table 4, we obtain a negative coefficient estimate on 
the gender indicator, showing that female ownership is also associated with a lower probability of 
being constrained conditional on other credit constraint determinants, although the estimate is not 
well-determined using Constraint Definition 1. This result is contrary to the conclusion reached in 
Muravyev et al. (2009) using the cross-country Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) focusing on Central and Eastern European (and a few Western European and Asian) 
countries, where they find credit discrimination against women at lower levels of financial 
development. However, due to missing information in the data set the analysis in Muravyev et al. 
(2009) does not  take into account the fact that firms not applying for formal bank loans are not 
                                                                                                                                                        




necessarily financially constrained. Female owners may be less likely to apply and get formal credit 
without being more constrained if they for example are more likely to operate smaller businesses or 
in sectors with an innate lower demand for external financing or if female entrepreneurs are more 
likely to have access to non-bank credit than their male counterparts. In addition, WDR (2011) 
documents that female entrepreneur’s in Africa are as likely to access credit compared to their male 
counterparts, indicating that Sub-Saharan Africa credit markets may be different in terms of gender 
discrimination.  
 
Regarding ethnicity, our results indicate that minority operated firms are less credit constrained than 
firms owned by Africans. And this is independent of the constraint definition used and whether we 
consider single ownership firms only. This is consistent with the credit-ethnicity results obtained in 
Biggs and Shah (2006), Fafchamps (2000) and Fisman (2003). 
 
TABLE 5: CREDIT CONSTRAINT DETERMINANT: MARGINAL EFFECTS ON PROBABILITY OF BEING CONSTRAINED 
   Constraint Definition 1    Constraint Definition 2 
   All firms 
Single owner 
firms   All  firms 
Single owner 
firms 
Gender (Female ownership = 1)  -0.022 -0.046 -0.034*  -0.054** 
(0.022) (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.028) 
Ethnicity (Minority = 1)  -0.075** -0.146*** -0.091*** -0.142*** 
(0.032) (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.051) 
Firm size (Number of employees, log)  -0.053*** -0.065***  -0.086*** -0.098*** 
(0.011) (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Firm age (Years)  -0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Location (Capitol = 1)  0.010 0.009  0.009  0.015 
(0.020) (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Legal ownership form (Sole proprietorship = 1)  0.028 0.037  0.026  0.039 
(0.022) (0.033)  (0.020)  (0.032) 
Firm part of a larger establishment (Yes = 1)  -0.037 -0.009  -0.015  -0.014 
(0.032) (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.046) 
Export directly (Yes = 1)  -0.009 -0.004  -0.112***  -0.087 
(0.035) (0.056)  (0.034)  (0.056) 
Manager experience (Years)  -0.002* -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Firm use informal credit sources (Yes = 1)  0.032 0.059**  -0.016 0.026 
(0.022) (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.026) 
Part of firm under foreign ownership (Yes = 1)  0.020 0.014 
(0.039) (0.042) 
Observation  2,942  2,034   2,942  2,034 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.07  0.13  0.08 
Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value one if the firm is credit constrained, zero 
otherwise. Probit estimates, average marginal effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at a 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Sector and country 





The negative association with firm size is the only additional effect that is well-determined for all 
four specifications reported.  
 
Turning to the generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the method essentially identifies two 
components of the unconditional credit gap, i.e., the difference between the share of credit 
constrained firms with female ownership and the share of credit constrained firms with male 
ownership, as they are given in Table 4. The first component is a measure of the importance of 
differences in observable characteristics between female and male owned firms. Following the 
literature, we refer to this component as the “characteristics effect”. The second component is a 
measure of the importance of differences in parameters for the two groups. It is often described as 
capturing variation in the returns to the characteristics between female and male firms. In the 
following it is denoted the “coefficient effect” or the unexplained component. Algebraically, the 
credit gap between female and male firms can be described by the following decomposition into two 
components where Δ is the expected credit constraint gap given both gender specific characteristics 
and coefficients (the “average difference”, or gap): 
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Focusing on the first line, the first term in brackets on the RHS is difference in expected constraints 
for female (F) and male (M) owed firms where the expectation is evaluated under the female 
parameters (βF). This is the explained component as it is extracting the importance of differences in 
endowments and weighing these using the same weights (the female parameters). The second term 
in brackets is the difference in expected constraints for male owned firms when the expectation is 
evaluated under the female parameters and the male parameters, respectively. This is the 
unexplained component of the credit gap. For linear regression models the expression is simply the 
two-way Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The general formulation in (1) is explained and exemplified 
in Bauer and Sinning (2008). 
 
The first line in the decomposition in (1) is formulated from the viewpoint of female firms, which 
means that group differences in the characteristics are weighted by the coefficients of female firms 
to determine the endowments effect. For the unexplained component, the difference in 




coefficient effect measures the change in expectations of male firm outcome, if they had female firm 
coefficients. In the second line the male and female coefficients and determinants are simply 
interchanged, showing the standard result that different weighting leads to different component 
estimates for a given average gap. Below we report results using both female and male firm 
coefficients as reference parameters. 
 
TABLE 6: GENERALIZED BLINDER-OAXACA DECOMPOSITION OF THE GENDER GAP 
   Constraint 1    Constraint 2 
   All firms  Single owner firms   All firms  Single owner firms
Difference in means  -0.023  -0.012  -0.052***  -0.025 
   (0.020)  (0.028)    (0.020)  (0.027) 
Characteristics 0.020  -0.004  0.041  0.041** 0.016  -0.028**  0.038  0.025 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.017) 
Coefficients -0.042  -0.019  -0.053  -0.053*  -0.068*** -0.024  -0.063*  -0.050* 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.030) 
Reference Coefficients  Female  Male  Female Male   Female  Male Female Male 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at a 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results of generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions by gender and constraint 
definition. The differences are negative as they match the differences, which can be computed from 
Table 4. In terms of magnitude, the differences are fairly small ranging from -1.2 to -2.5 percentage 
points in three cases—for Constraint Definition 1 and the full sample and in both cases using 
Definition 2. Applying Definition 2 and including all firms we find a statistically significant difference 
of -5.2 percentage points. For single ownership firms the characteristics effect is generally positive, 
indicating that if credit was allocated based on differences in observable characteristics, female 
operated firms would be more constrained than male operated ones. The observation that female 
owned firms are on average less constrained in formal credit markets is, thus, driven by the 
unexplained effect. Hence, the results in Tables 5 and 6 lead to the conclusion that gender 
differences in credit constraints are small and, if anything, there is female favoritism rather than 
discrimination in the formal African credit markets, a result also reached in Aterido et al. (2011). 
 
3.2  Credit Constraints, Gender, and Firm Size 
The small and often insignificant, average gender credit constraint gap may be a result of a 
composition effect. If government (and donor) supported credit programs are targeting micro/small 




being less constrained than the male owned counterparts. In Figure 2 we look into this composition 
effect. The Figure shows the association between firm size and the share of credit constrained firms, 
split by gender. The black curve is the share of credit constrained firms with female ownership while 
the gray curve is the share of constrained firms with male ownership. The shaded area indicates the 
point-wise 90 percent confidence interval for the firms with female ownership.  The two vertical 
lines in the plots indicate the upper limits on the size of micro and small enterprises using the 
standard World Bank definition.
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Note: Kernel weighed local mean smoothing using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwith of 0.8. Black 
curves are for female owned firms; gray curves are for male owned firms. Shaded areas are point-wise 90% 
confidence intervals for the female estimates. Vertical lines are at 2.30 and 3.91 indicating 10 and 50 
employees, respectively 
  
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the negative association between firm size and the probability of being 
credit constrained. The figure also indicates a difference in the association for firms with male and 
female ownership. For micro/small firms female ownership is associated with a lower probability of 
being credit constrained than male ownership. For medium size firms the relationship is reversed 
indicating easier access to formal credit for firms with male ownership. 
                                                 
3 The World Bank SME Department operates with three groups of small and medium-sized enterprises: micro, 
small, and medium scale firms. Micro firms have up to 10 employees, small enterprises up to 50 employees, 




TABLE 7: AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS ON PROBABILITY OF BEING CONSTRAINED WITH GENDER AND FIRM SIZE 
INTERACTION 
   Constraint Definition 1    Constraint Definition 2 
   All firms 
Single owner 
firms   All  firms 
Single owner 
firms 
Gender (Female ownership = 1)  -0.025 -0.046  -0.038*  -0.054** 
(0.022) (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.028) 
Ethnicity (Minority = 1)  -0.070** -0.145***  -0.087*** -0.141*** 
(0.032) (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.051) 
Firm size (Number of employees, log)  -0.054*** -0.065***  -0.087*** -0.098*** 
(0.011) (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Firm age (Years)  0.000 -0.001  0.001  0.000 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Location (Capitol = 1)  0.011 0.009  0.010  0.015 
(0.020) (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Legal ownership form (Sole proprietorship = 1)  0.030 0.037  0.028  0.039 
(0.022) (0.033)  (0.020)  (0.032) 
Firm part of a larger establishment (Yes = 1)  -0.034 -0.009  -0.013  -0.013 
(0.033) (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.046) 
Export directly (Yes = 1)  -0.012 -0.004 -0.114***  -0.087 
(0.035) (0.056)  (0.033)  (0.056) 
Manager experience (Years)  -0.002 -0.001  -0.002*  -0.002 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Firm use informal credit sources (Yes = 1)  0.033 0.059**  -0.014 0.026 
(0.022) (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.026) 
Part of firm under foreign ownership (Yes = 1)  0.019 0.013 
(0.039) (0.042) 
Firm size at which gender gap is zero (log)  3.420***  14.98  3.438***  6.932 
(0.707) (115.3)  (0.592)  (13.17) 
Observation  2,942  2,034   2,942  2,034 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.07    0.13  0.08 
Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value one if the firm is credit constrained, zero 
otherwise. Probit estimates, average marginal effects. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at a 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Sector and country 
factors are included in all regressions. 
 
 
In Table 7 we report average marginal effects on the probability of being credit constrained when 
the gender of the owner is interacted with firm size. The Table shows that the estimated average 
marginal effects are practically identical with the results reported in Table 5. Still, Figure 3 illustrates 
that the estimated probabilities of being credit constrained vary strongly with firm size and that this 














































































































































Note: Estimated probabilities of being credit constrained by size and gender. Upper black curves are for female 
owned firms; gray curves are for male owned firms. Lower black curves are the estimated credit gaps: the 
estimated gain of having female ownership. Shaded areas are point-wise 90% confidence intervals for the 
gaps. Vertical lines are at 2.30 and 3.91 indicating 10 and 50 employees, respectively 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the estimated probabilities of being credit constrained, similarly to Figure 2, but 
in Figure 3 the probabilities are model-based and, hence, conditional on firm characteristics and 
sector/country factors. The upper black curves are for female owned firms while the gray curves are 
for male owned firms. The curves in the lower parts of the plots are the estimated gaps (the 
differences between the gender specific probabilities of being credit constrained), which is the 
estimated marginal effect of female firm ownership. The shaded area indicates the 90%-point-wise 
confidence intervals for the gaps.  
 
Considering the sample of all firms we find the gap to be significantly increasing with firm size and 
we estimate that the constraint probabilities are equal for firms with 30 employees regardless of the 
constraint definition (Table 7). For smaller firms, credit constraints are less likely for female owned 
firms while they are more likely when for firms with more than 30 employees. The gender/size effect 
is much smaller when using the single ownership sample and the gap is generally not significant for 




credit policies for micro/small and medium size firms. Based on the analysis, we cannot say if the 
association between size, gender and credit constraints is smooth as in Figure 3 (which is smooth by 
assumption) or if there is a threshold effect. For simplicity we make a sample split along the World 
Bank definition of small and medium size firms. That is, we look at generalized Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions of the share of male and female credit constrained firms split into two size 
categories: firms with 5-49 employees (micro/small) and firms with 50-300 employees.  The results 
are given in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8: GENERALIZED BLINDER-OAXACA DECOMPOSITION OF GENDER GAP – BY FIRM SIZE   
   Constraint Definition 1    Constraint Definition 2 
Panel A: Micro/Small firms All firms  Single owner firms   All firms  Single owner firms
Difference in means  -0.048**  -0.039  -0.075***  -0.049* 
   (0.023)  (0.027)    (0.023)  (0.029) 
Characteristics 0.015  -0.012 0.024  0.032  0.011  -0.030**  0.018  0.018 
(0.023)  (0.015) (0.032) (0.018)  (0.024) (0.015) (0.037) (0.019) 
Coefficients -0.063**  -0.036 -0.063  -0.071** -0.087*** -0.045*  -0.067  -0.067**
(0.032)  (0.026) (0.040) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.025) (0.045) (0.033) 
Reference Coefficients  Female  Male  Female Male    Female Male Female Male 
Panel B: Medium firms 
Difference in means  0.110**  0.237***  0.068**  0.154** 
   (0.046)  (0.092)    (0.034)  (0.063) 
Characteristics 0.028  0.055* 0.036  0.079  -0.028  0.004  -0.160*  -0.032 
(0.070)  (0.032) (0.063) (0.061)  (0.079) (0.025) (0.098) (0.109) 
Coefficients 0.082  0.055  0.202*** 0.159  0.096  0.064*  0.314***  0.186 
(0.075)  (0.050) (0.039) (0.112)  (0.075) (0.038) (0.104) (0.120) 
Reference Coefficients  Female  Male  Female Male    Female Male Female Male 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance
at a 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
The new decomposition is interesting because the overall result in Table 6 showing quite small 
gender differences may well be driven by small enterprises as it is reversed for larger firms. For 
micro and small firms the difference between the unconditional probabilities of being credit 
constrained (by Definition 1) is just below 5 percentage points—with female owned firms being the 
less constrained. In contrast, for the medium sized firms male owned firms have an 11 percentage 
points lower probability of being constrained. Both differences are of a different order of magnitude 
compared to the results in Table 6 and they are statistically significant at conventional levels of 
significance. 
 
This marked size dependence is strengthened when using the single owner sample as the difference 




owner firms is quite small, though). Moreover, the pattern is the same using the second definition of 
being credit constrained. 
 
The decomposition of the differences in the probabilities of being credit constrained reveals an 
interesting pattern giving rise to our claim that female favoritism in lending to small businesses is the 
main cause of the outcome for female owned firms. Looking at the micro/small enterprises the part 
of the difference in the probabilities attributed to differences in mean characteristics between male 
and female owned firms is very small and typically insignificant regardless of the choice of reference. 
In contrast, the unexplained effect is statistically significant and about the size of the total 
difference. Hence, based on the observable characteristics of the firms we would expect to find no 
difference in the share of constrained firms across gender. The difference we do find is caused by 
differences in the regression coefficients. As these differences are normally associated with the 
notions of discrimination and favoritism, we reach the conclusion that small female owned firms are 
favored in formal loan applications. The conclusion is fairly robust to changes in the definition of 
being credit constrained and to changes in the sample. 
 
For the medium size firms it is impossible to infer with any confidence is the significant gap is due to 
characteristics or coefficients. For the sample of single owner firms we find significant coefficient 
effects when using the female parameters as reference. But, the results are based on few 
observations and they are not robust to changes in reference coefficients. Hence, the substantial 
result is that the lending favoritism, observed for micro/small firms, does not cover medium sized 
firms with female ownership. 
 
3.3  Self-selection into Entrepreneurship and Revealed Capabilities 
Apart from favoritism there may be another reason for the decomposition result for the micro/small 
firms. Aterido et. al. (2011) argue that because of overall discrimination against female 
entrepreneurs there may be biased self-selection into entrepreneurship as female entrepreneurs 
need special (unobservable) capabilities in order to enter formal manufacturing as owners. Hence, 
we would expect female entrepreneurs who are able to break the “glass ceiling”, to have better 
capabilities, on average, than the average male entrepreneur. The superior capabilities should in 
turn make female entrepreneurs more likely to obtain formal credit conditional on observable 
characteristics. 




As entrepreneur capabilities are likely to be correlated with both the ability to obtain credit and 
general firm performance it is interesting that Bigsten and Söderbom (2011) highlight how 
technology often is not the main determinant of enterprise success in Africa, especially when 
considering firms producing relatively unsophisticated products. Managerial capacity and capabilities 
(often unrevealed) are more important and market intelligence has been found to be particularly 
decisive for firm success.
4  
 
TABLE 9: PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS FOR MICRO/SMALL FIRMS  
     
Capacity utilization 
(1 (low) to 17 (high))
Labor productivity




Mean 11.1  -0.148  0.276 
2164
sd 3.9  0.746  0.393 
Constrained, Def. 1 
Mean 10.8***  -0.178*  0.283 
977
sd 3.9  0.695  0.387 
Unconstrained, Def. 1 
Mean 11.4***  -0.124*  0.271 
1187
sd 3.8  0.785  0.398 
Constrained, Def. 2 
Mean 10.8***  -0.193**  0.284 
825
sd 3.8  0.655  0.369 
Unconstrained, Def. 2 
Mean 11.3***  -0.120**  0.272 
1339
sd 3.9  0.796  0.408 
Female, all firms 
Mean 11.0  -0.214**  0.263 
528
sd 3.9  0.691  0.399 
Male, all firms 
Mean 11.1  -0.127**  0.281 
1636
sd 3.9  0.761  0.391 
Female, single owner firms 
Mean 11.2  -0.258**  0.280 
346
sd 3.8  0.694  0.374 
Male, single owner firms 
Mean 11.1  -0.167**  0.306 
1290
sd 3.9  0.718  0.381 
Note:  *, **, *** indicate significant differences in means using two sample t-test with unequal variance at a 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
When managerial capacity and capabilities are important determinants of firm success, the self-
selection hypothesis is indirectly testable. Assuming female entrepreneurs have superior capabilities 
we would expect female entrepreneurs, on average, to outperform male performance on revealed 
capability indicators such as productivity and efficiency. In Table 9 we report summary statistics for 
three productivity/efficiency indicators for micro/small firms: (i) capacity utilization, (ii) labor 
productivity, and (iii) employment growth. As seen, credit constraints and efficiency are related. 
Both capacity utilization and labor productivity growth have a negative association with being credit 
                                                 
4 Market intelligence refers to (i) the ability of managers/owners to communicate and interact efficiently with 
suppliers and buyers, (ii) knowledge of where to position the firm in relation to existing distribution networks 
and how to develop new distribution channels, (iii) ability to create a well-organized and efficient working 




constrained, regardless of our credit constraint definition. Employment growth, on the other hand, 
appears to have little (partial) relation with credit constraints. 
 
Regarding firm ownership we find no relationship between the gender of the owner and capacity 
utilization or employment growth. For labor productivity, female owned firms have lower growth, on 
average, than male owned firms and the results hold for both firm samples. The results are 
interesting as the credit constraint and ownership associations should not be in opposite directions 
when female owned firms are less credit constrained and, further, when women are better 
entrepreneurs than men, on average, because of selection, the negative association with labor 
productivity growth is even more puzzling. 
 
TABLE 10: REVEALED FEMALE CAPABILITIES IN MICRO/SMALL FIRMS 
   Capacity utilization   Labor productivity growth   Employment growth 
   All firms 
Single 
owner 
firms  All  firms 
Single
 owner  




Gender   -0.295 -0.276  -0.010  0.019  0.007 -0.013 
  (0.210)  (0.249) (0.038) (0.040) (0.018)  (0.020) 
Ethnicity  0.149 0.211 0.229***  0.222***  -0.311***  -0.315***
  (0.127)  (0.147) (0.025) (0.027) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Lag firm size  -0.319 -0.284  -0.089  0.056  0.059* 0.075 
  (0.339)  (0.522) (0.060) (0.100) (0.032)  (0.047) 
Firm age  -0.002 0.003  0.001  0.001 -0.004***  -0.004***
  (0.011)  (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Location  -0.577*** -0.861*** -0.062* -0.115***  0.054***  0.044** 
  (0.205)  (0.237) (0.036) (0.040) (0.018)  (0.019) 
Legal ownership form  -0.081 -0.511*  0.072*  0.055  -0.033* -0.012 
  (0.202)  (0.292) (0.042) (0.057) (0.018)  (0.025) 
Firm part of a larger establishment  -0.064 -0.444 -0.167** -0.182* 0.169***  0.171***
  (0.377)  (0.499) (0.077) (0.103) (0.033)  (0.041) 
Export directly  -0.096 0.009  -0.033  0.002  0.094**  0.188***
  (0.422)  (0.520) (0.068) (0.108) (0.044)  (0.057) 
Firm use informal credit sources  -0.031** -0.040*** -0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.012)  (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Manager experience (Years)  0.093 0.280 0.098**  0.068  0.011 0.014 
  (0.230)  (0.264) (0.041) (0.044) (0.017)  (0.019) 
Part of firm under foreign ownership  0.270 -0.052  0.020 
  (0.428) (0.063)  (0.038) 
Observations 2164  1636    2164  1636    2164  1636 
R-squared 0.04  0.05    0.12  0.17    0.35  0.35 
Note: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent level, respectively. The lag firm size is the log of the number of employees three years





One explanation for the results in Table 9, often put forward in the literature, could be that men and 
women enter into different sectors with different growth potentials (see for example Buvinic and 
Berger (1990) in the case of Peru). To take this possibility into account we in Table 10 therefore test 
if firms with female ownership are more efficient than their male counterparts conditional on 
observable characteristics. The results are clear. The female mean effect is both small and 
statistically insignificant in all regressions. In sum, based on the three productivity/efficiency 
indicators we find no support for the self-selection hypothesis.  
 
Our regression results are in line with the more general results reached in Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
reviewing gender related experimental economics literature. According to the review, the evidence 
suggests that managers and entrepreneurs present an important exception to the rule that women 
are more risk averse than men. Thus, although gender differences in risk preferences among the 
general population exist, it does not extend to entrepreneurs/business managers. This result could 
be due to selection. More risk taking individuals tend to choose the entrepreneurial path. But 
although fewer women select this path, they have similar risk preferences as men. Our result 
indicates that female entrepreneurs are like their male counterparts in other respects than risk 
aversion. 
    
4.  Conclusion 
Using firm level data from eight Sub-Saharan Africa countries we examine credit constraint 
differentials between male and female manufacturing entrepreneurs. In line with previous studies 
(Aterido et al., 2011) we find that enterprises owned by female entrepreneurs are less likely to be 
credit constrained compared to their male counterparts. We decompose the difference in the 
probability of being credit constrained by applying a generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. This 
decomposition shows that the credit gap is mostly due to differences in the unexplained component. 
Furthermore, some of our results indicate that if credit was allocated based on differences in 
observable characteristics, female operated firms should be more constrained than male owned 
ones. 
 
Understanding the gender credit constraint gap is of central policy importance as many donor 
funded credit programs in Sub-Saharan Africa target female entrepreneurs. The main explanation in 




entrepreneurship. Women are argued to be (on average) better entrepreneurs—and hence should 
be allocated more formal external finance—because they have to be “more capable” than men to 
become entrepreneurs. However, we find this story to be largely unsupported by the data.  
 
First, we illustrate that firm size, besides being an important determinant of the probability of facing 
credit constraints in the formal financial market, has differential impacts on male and female owned 
enterprises. Specifically, we show that the gender credit gap is reversed for medium size firms (50 
employees and above) compared to their smaller counterparts. Moreover, the credit gap for 
medium size firms can to larger extent be explained by differences in firm characteristics while this is 
not the case for micro and small firms.  
 
Second, we question whether the favorable treatment of female owned smaller firms is related to 
discrimination in the entrepreneurship selection process, as we cannot find gender differentials in 
capacity utilization, labor productivity growth, or firm growth. Hence, we observe no revealed, 
capability differences amongst male and female owned firms. 
 
Based on our analysis we conclude that the credit constraint gap is caused by favoritism towards 
smaller enterprises with female ownership. Consequently we would suggest that donors and policy 
makers, instead of calling for more credit to small female owned firms, focus the effort on improving 
the functioning and competitiveness of the financial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa as such, and 
support female entrepreneurs in other ways than by (more) policy driven bank credit. 
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